America's process from Syrian "accountability to "liberation"

Rime Allaf, March 2005

If relations between the US and Syria were to be judged solely on the basis of their current confrontation, a reasonable deduction would be that they have always been tense and that this was an inevitable conclusion to an uninterrupted era of antagonism.  After all, Syria has been on the US list of terrorism sponsors since 1979, and its support of Iran since the 8-year war launched by Saddam Hussein (with the blessing of the West) certainly contributed to a cool state of affairs.

This, however, did not stop the two countries from maintaining diplomatic relations, nor even from enjoying reasonably cordial relations in the nineties, after Syria’s significant participation in the multinational coalition liberating Kuwait in 1991.  This had led to an American carte blanche on Syrian hegemony in Lebanon, and to US sponsorship of the now defunct peace process launched in Madrid.

The “ancien regime” had shown foresight by predicting changed global conditions and the demise of the Soviet Union, repositioning itself accordingly and reaching for the consequential political and economic dividends.  Hafez Assad had actively engaged with the US, and George H. Bush and Bill Clinton had reciprocated, recognizing Syria’s unavoidable role in the region, its legitimate demands for the return of the Golan Heights, and the equation of land for peace.

The situation their successors inherited, taking office within months of each other, was considerably more tense; there was neither a wish (for George W. Bush) nor an opportunity (for Bashar Assad) to continue the dialogue.  The new American administration was at first determined to distance itself from the Clintonian approach to the Middle East conflict and largely ignored the Intifada, except to regularly reassert Israel’s “right to self-defense.”  The Syrian regime, for its part, was busy dealing with the “Damascus spring” after having promised reform, rallying behind the Palestinians, and re-adjusting to a new situation in Lebanon.

September 11 was to rekindle US-Syrian exchanges in an odd way.  When Bush declared war on terror, Syria freely offered extensive intelligence on a number of Islamist groups, calculating this would buy it leverage on other fronts.  But this was a superficial reading of American posture: Washington expected such cooperation as its rightful due, neither considering it a favor, nor willing to make exceptions in the case of the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance groups supported by Syria – especially with active Israeli lobbying to that end.  With Syria, the US was not ready to give, but only take, and the Bush administration remained uncompromising and inexplicably aggressive from the start.

The scales completely tipped with the invasion of Iraq, when Syria adopted defiant and provocative rhetoric, instead of wisely maneuvering to circumvent the quick American temper and the new designs on the region.  After having voted for Resolution 1441, Syria publicly wished for the defeat of the invaders.  With this confrontational language, Syria merely achieved immediate American fury, bringing accusations of Syrian assistance to the Iraqi insurgency and to members of Saddam Hussein’s entourage, unverified claims which Syria is expected to somehow disprove. 

Syria tried to offset these charges by first “missing” the vote on Resolution 1483 on Iraq (claiming afterwards that it would have voted in its favor) and by subsequently voting for Resolution 1511 (days after Israel had struck within Syria for the first time in 30 years), but the Bush administration, as usual, was in no mood to barter and continued to rebuff Syrian attempts to relaunch the peace process, even excluding it from the Roadmap.

Israel had been pushing Congress to penalize Syria for years; the Syrian regime not only completely ignored the warning signs at its own peril, but even contributed to its own isolation by needlessly adopting this belligerent tone on Iraq.  When Congress finally passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act in November 2003, it was mainly as a result of Syria’s position on Iraq, and its stunning lack of self-preservation actions in the face of the angry superpower.

While Iraq was the precursor to the Syria Accountability Act, it is Lebanon which will most likely herald the passing of the Lebanon and Syria Liberation Act, a bill which has already been introduced to Congress.  Is Syria simply hoping for catastrophe to be averted at the eleventh hour? Or will it counter this renewed threat of sanctions (or worse) in a timely manner?

Recent examples of Syrian reactions to pressure are not reassuring.  The unpopular (and unconstitutional) extension to President Emile Lahoud’s term was made in spite of urgent warnings from numerous parties; yet, Syria seemed genuinely surprised by the quick passing of UNSC Resolution 1559, and by the Franco-American agreement on this front.  Assuming that France and the US could not reconcile after disagreements on Iraq, Syria thought French complaints about its interference in Lebanon would eventually diminish, and that the gamble on Lahoud would pay off.

Once again, Syria misread the signs and failed to understand international mood, having overly (and wrongly) depended on Europe to counter-balance American pressure, and having expected the European Union’s desire to finalize the Association Agreement to weigh in its favor.  This short-sightedness put Syria in an entirely new position it had not even considered: before Resolution 1559, and putting aside the resolutions prohibiting the export of Iraqi oil (which US allies Jordan and Turkey also blatantly disregarded), Syria had technically not been in breach of international law. 

Adherence to UN resolutions (especially 242 and 338) have since long provided the foundation for Syria’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Israel, and the moral high ground allowing it to demand the return of its land.  If only for this reason, although an implied equivalence of the Syrian presence in Lebanon with Israel’s occupation of Arab land is unfounded, there was little doubt that Syria would withdraw from Lebanon and comply with its obligations under 1559.  After the upheaval following the assassination of Rafik Hariri, who was instrumental in instigating 1559, any semblance of a choice has vanished anyway.

With full disregard for their own double standards in ignoring the Golan issue, Americans will undoubtedly continue to pile on the pressure even after Syria’s withdrawal (the disarming of Hezbollah, for example, can easily be pinned on Syria).  In fact, the Syria Liberation Act mentions Resolution 1559.  Furthermore, Resolution 1566, falling under Chapter 7 and considering assassinations as a threat to international peace and security, may eventually enter the equation if the UN inquiry determines that Hariri’s assassination was linked in some way to Syria.

Damage control should be the top priority on the Syrian regime’s list, but its reaction to events in the last six weeks has been slow and muddled, and the public relations effort continues to shine by its absence.  While repairing relations with Lebanon needs time and wisdom, and while the EU will probably refrain from upgrading the pressure if Syria complies with 1559, the US ambassador to Damascus has yet to return to her post, further sanctions are threatened on the Syria Accountability Act, and an obsessive Bush has been warning Syria on a daily basis, in a manner reminiscent of the campaign against Iraq before March 2003.  It is the relationship with the US that needs immediate attention.

But this is easier said than done, and few external concessions remain at its disposal.  Syria cooperated increasingly on Iraq (from border controls to election assistance), offered unconditional negotiations with Israel, backed the Palestinian Authority, dropped claims to Alexandretta, and reached a border agreement with Jordan.  Could internal political and economic reform now save Syria from Bush’s impatience?  Assuming the US is really interested in democracy, as claimed in the Syria Liberation Act bill, and given the demands of the growing civil society in Syria, it seems to be the best option for the Syrian regime now.