New names, same games in Lebanon
Rime Allaf - Jun 2009
Al Jazeera

It’s difficult to pinpoint exactly when the discourse about Syria, and about Syrian-Lebanese relations, became simplistic to the point of ridicule, given that sweeping statements had been the norm even before the assassination of Rafik Hariri in February 2005.

With the downward spiral following United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 of September 2004, which put Syria in contravention of international law for the first time with its stipulation that all foreign forces must leave Lebanon, the rhetoric began to reflect the extremes of the two main camps vying for influence over Lebanon.

On one side, sharing the “values” of a post-9/11 world which the Bush administration allegedly espoused, was what became the anti-Syrian March 14 camp; on the other, manifesting its internal strength by refusing to renounce the armed militantism of the resistance, the pro-Syrian March 8 camp marked its position on the political map for the first time.

Both factions decried foreign interference in Lebanese affairs and accused their political opponents of not putting Lebanon first. In fact, both were right in lamenting the opponent’s support from a foreign power; this made their respective slogans about freedom, independence and sovereignty sounding equally moot.

The marketeers of the “Cedar Revolution” – or the March 14 group - had hastily rebranded their campaign when it became clear the previous “Independence Intifada” moniker inadvertently made connotations with the original intifada in occupied Palestine, which was not as cool.

The resistance fighters, the March 8 group, in contrast, were mostly unchoreographed and unscripted, and their insistence in thanking Syria for its long role in Lebanon, as it finalized a precipitated withdrawal, was considered pure provocation.

Clearly, the jury is still out about the definitive version of Syria’s role in Lebanon; but even with the lack of historical perspective and with official Syrian admissions that mistakes were made, it is impossible to take at face value the unending supply of stories, rumours and deductions about alleged Syrian crimes.

Indeed, March 14 forces have automatically attributed each and every criminal incident, every assassination and every bomb to Syria, or, lately, to its allies - Hezbollah and the partisans of General Michel Aoun - as they supposedly terrorize Lebanon into submission and impose impediments to the political process and the roundtable. Even the lamentable events which led to the Lebanese army’s destruction of the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr Al Bared were blamed on Syria.

If it were not for Syria, apparently, the Lebanese would be living in a unique, crime-free, honest, morally-driven and ethical democracy, convening national dialogue on every issue and agreeing to disagree while maintaining fluidity in their state affairs and government plans.

Allegations about multiple Syrian crimes, without the burden of proof, have been accompanied by a continuous commentary on Syrian intentions; influence in Lebanon is both a means to an end, and an end in itself, they say, and proven culpability for the assassination of Rafik Hariri would seriously hinder this status quo. With each criminal action, goes the tale, Syria is attempting to jeopardize the work of the tribunal and blackmail Lebanon.

The shock was understandable, therefore, when after years spent languishing without even being charged, the four Lebanese generals, the only designated suspects, were released from jail mere weeks before the parliamentary election this June 7. In a process which Syria had always condemned as being politicized from the start, it was ruled there would be no judging without sufficient evidence.

While this should have momentarily brought the accusations to a full circle, there seems to be little wish to tone down the rhetoric; no sooner had the generals come out of jail than an article appeared in a German weekly, announcing that it was Hezbollah, after all, which organized the Hariri assassination. Or so said the mysterious “sources.” Most observers considered this accusation to be merely a renewed attempt to influence the parliamentary election.

Of much bigger importance is the issue of Lebanese military officials spying for Israel which is, of course, a Pandora’s box whose lid is only beginning to open with the arrest of a colonel who has admitted the charges.

Indeed, amidst the crescendo of accusations about Syria and its allies, the biggest threat which never ceased to manifest itself remained Israel, whose July 2006 savage onslaught sent droves of Lebanese refugees across the Syrian border, where they were welcomed with open arms and homes.

Not only did this war bring back a dose of reality about the bigger stakes, but it also put Lebanon’s current majority in a difficult position, against Hezbollah and effectively on Israel’s side.

The war was a turning point where real alliances could not remain in the background any longer. On Hezbollah’s side were Syria and Iran. On the other side, with all its connotations, were the majority, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and their Western allies (particularly the US and France), making little secret of their wish for Hezbollah to be smashed.

No matter how it is packaged, and even if was explained as holding Hezbollah for having provoked Israel by seizing its soldiers, the enormity of this situation was unprecedented, and it lay the ground for the next big crisis which would hit Lebanon in May 2008, when majority and opposition faced each other as militias rather than as parties, and when Hezbollah used its arms internally for the first time.

The denouement of that crisis, arranged by Qatar, was in effect a truce signed by the Lebanese on behalf of their different sponsors and supporters.

In the days of Pax Syriana (following the Taef Agreement which ended the Lebanese civil war and established Syria as the de facto boss), most parties complied with the S-S dynamic ruling their lives: as long as Syria and Saudi Arabia agreed on the path to follow, Lebanon was relatively quiet.

Today, while the major regional players are the same, they are betting on different horses. Through their respective media, spokespeople and declared positions, the majority and the opposition are representing the interests of foreign patrons, and the long-term goals the latter project for the region.

The above considerations and the nature of Lebanon’s consociational system (guaranteeing proportional representation for all groups) make parliamentary elections less open to influence, and there are no landslides on any side.

Until there is a new census reflecting current demographics, most groups in the country are secure in the fact that they have a voice in government. It does matter, of course, who wins the most seats and who is charged with forming a government, and many observers wonder whether Hezbollah’s time has come to become the majority.

Given the clumsy foreign interference - including a pointless visit to Beirut by US Vice President Joe Biden - clearly aiming at turning people away from voting for Hezbollah and its allies, there seems to be real questions on the latters’ capacity, or even desire, to reach office.

While General Michel Aoun, a Maronite and leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, would certainly welcome a presidential role eventually, Hezbollah would probably be happy to remain in opposition, especially since it has already proved its capacity to overturn decisions when needed. In opposition, the party is not under the immediate and constant pressure of having to forego its weapons, and it can still participate in the decision-making process.

This situation would also serve Syria’s interests for the time being; although it has been accused of trying to influence the election, this is in fact one of the times when it least needs to coax its allies and its foes into nominating an agreeable prime minister – the rumour being that a figure like Najib Miqati, acceptable to both extremes, would be a strong contender.

As the last couple of years have demonstrated, nothing in Lebanon was resolved until all interested parties, especially Syria, were on board.

Even Syrians themselves could not have imagined, four years ago, that the period of relative calm experienced today would have been possible.

With diplomatic relations finally established and embassies opened in 2009, and with confidence returning even on the popular level - with ordinary Syrians feeling safe again in Lebanon, if not completely welcome -these are times of renewed confidence and belief in the power of regional alignments.

Even without their own man in office in Lebanon, the Syrians know there is now little chance for any government to provoke it on the big issues and only need to wait for the other foreign powers to come to terms with this reality. Saudi Arabia has already organized a public reconciliation with Syria, and France was the first Western power to rekindle relations after a few bad years. If the Obama administration eventually delivers on its own promises for change, we are about to see a different regional understanding which brings all the neighbors on board.

As far as Syria is concerned, its opponents have so far made all the right mistakes and have now relegated the Hariri tribunal to the back burner. Indeed, with enemies like these, who needs friends?

Rime Allaf, Associate Fellow at Chatham House.