Syria: Back to pole position
Rime Allaf - Jan 2010
Middle East International

A Syrian president’s visit to a Saudi king would not have triggered much interest a few years ago, but the meeting between Bashar al-Asad and King Abdallah in Riyadh on 13 January was headline news in the Arab media. It marked a major step on the road to Syrian-Saudi recovery from near-breaking point, and the full resumption of a leading Syrian regional role.

After the advent of the Bush administration, descriptions of Syria’s isolation and quasi-banishment into an axis of ignored states became commonplace -- even before the invasion of Iraq and, ironically, while Syria sat on the Security Council. This vision did materialise when a Franco-American dispute over Iraq was resolved with an agreement over Lebanon, at Syria’s expense. The events triggered by UN Security Council Resolution 1559 in 2004 and the assassination of Rafik Hariri in February 2005, most notably the precipitate withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, convinced many that the Syrian regime could never recover, and that Syria’s regional clout had gone.

Judging from the current climate, however, it would seem that reports of Syria’s political demise have been greatly exaggerated. Five years after it left Lebanon and became the focus of regional and international condemnation, Damascus today is again being courted as an indispensible link. Moreover, the events leading to its resurgence have created a new balance of power in the region, with Syria’s realignment outside of the Saudi-Egyptian axis being the most significant, albeit unintended, consequence.

Cairo continues to turn a cold shoulder towards Damascus, partly because it has repeatedly failed to bring its promised inter-Palestinian settlement to fruition and faults Syrian influence on Hamas. But with Saudi Arabia, a far weightier force in Arab politics, reaching out to Syria, it is Egypt which seemingly stands to lose more, for now. Syria’s legendary habit of waiting for things to change, rather than changing much in its own policy, seems, meanwhile, to have paid off.


New alignment

Indeed, the question to be posed is not what Syria did right, but rather what its opponents did wrong. With the weakening of the Saudi-Syrian-Egyptian axis that once dominated Arab politics, Riyadh and Cairo in fact lost their own sway over Damascus and its allies, including non-state actors like Hizbullah. When the latter was directly targeted during Israel’s ferocious assault on Lebanon in 2006, regional divisions were openly exposed: Hizbullah’s strong performance was not anticipated by its opponents, and Syria’s claimed share of its victory - and its direct criticism of Saudi Arabia – were even less palatable.

Syria’s position was additionally boosted by its increasing closeness to Qatar, whose growing clout helped redress the tables when the main Lebanese factions took their differences to the streets of Beirut in May 2008. It was in Doha that the Lebanese stand-off was resolved, with the support of France and the blessing of Syria.

This development consolidated a new alignment of forces; Syria was not only back in a powerful camp, but it seemed to be the strongest link that enabled a liaison between all parties. In contrast to other Gulf states, Qatar now had a significant role to play in a new axis with Syria, Iran and Turkey, which Saudi Arabia viewed with mistrust. While Riyadh had been wary of Iran’s position for years, it had not expected a revival of Turkish influence in the region, especially not as a self-proclaimed Muslim power.

Syria’s rapprochement with Turkey has been a major factor in strengthening its regional standing. Ankara’s positions on the Palestinian issue, and on Syrian-Israeli talks, have bolstered this alliance to the increasing discomfort of Riyadh. As Israel launched its most brutal assault yet on Palestinians in Gaza one year ago, Ankara’s condemnations resonated much more loudly in the Arab world than the meek protestations emanating from the Saudi camp, a situation which Riyadh needed to adjust.

But it was left to Lebanese politics, once again, to pave the way for a reconciliation between Syria and Saudi Arabia. Having delivered on its promise to establish diplomatic relations and exchange embassies with Lebanon, Syria observed the parliamentary elections with no open meddling, unlike other concerned powers. Following the inevitable Lebanese deadlock, Syria was now being asked to interfere again, and to pressure its allies to reach a compromise, resulting in the nomination of Saad al-Hariri as prime minister, the formation of a government acceptable to all, and the Syrian-Saudi reconciliation.


New chapter

King Abdallah’s unprecedented October 2009 visit to Damascus was the clearest sign yet that bygones seemed to have become bygones, at least for the sake of appearances, and that the time had come for a new chapter. However, it is undoubtedly Hariri’s visit to Damascus in December which most vividly illustrated the change in climate. Having spent years accusing the Syrian regime of his father’s assassination, the new Lebanese prime minister was now being feted like royalty in Damascus. Moreover, even Syria’s loudest Lebanese critics -- from Druze leader Walid Jumblatt to Samir Geagea of the Lebanese Forces -- were now sending conciliatory signals and looking for opportunities to rekindle their relations with the Syrian regime. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, meanwhile, seems to be quietly becoming more insignificant.

These changes have occurred with minimal adjustments in Syrian policies, and the most contentious demand of all -- that Syria should downgrade ties with Iran -- remains unattainable. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that Syria would need, let alone want, to sever a mutually beneficial alliance dating back 30 years. While Saudi-owned media continue to argue that Syria is being lured back into the ‘Arab fold’ again, the reality is that Syria remains comfortably tied to both camps.

Asad’s visit to Riyadh underlined that. Even though Saudi Arabia has clashed with Iran over Yemen, Syria did not hesitate to declare its support for the Saudi position, rather than that of its traditional ally. With this gesture, Damascus demonstrated that its alliance with Iran is not incompatible with its relations with other Arab states. The Saudis reciprocated, defending Syria when the Iraqi prime minister accused it of allowing bombers to wreak havoc in Baghdad last August.

Syria’s relatively comfortable position in the Arab world today certainly does not mean that all efforts to isolate it have ended. The American exception continues to baffle Damascus. It enthused about the election of Barack Obama, after enduring a hostile Bush administration for years, but evidently misread US declarations. Rumours that the US would return an ambassador to Damascus have not materialised, and the US has shown little desire to join in turning over a new page. On the contrary, the Obama administration has renewed sanctions on Syria, and last month blocked an important deal with Airbus aimed at renewing Syria’s ageing fleet of civilian airliners. And while George Mitchell’s visits to Damascus, another of which is due this month, have come in the context of the overall Arab-Israeli peace process, they can hardly be taken as constructive or as indicative of progress.

For the time being, nevertheless, Syria’s critics have not achieved their declared aims of isolating it and changing its alliances, and the country has managed to regain pole position in the race for regional significance.