Syrian media is really a source of continual entertainment. After all, who would have imagined a year ago that the Syrian regime would need to quote Michel Aoun, of all people, to decry the speeches given on the first anniversary of Rafik Hariri's assassination? Of course, given the heated rhetoric heard in Beirut, it is no wonder that Aoun's prose is suddenly music to Syria's ears when compared to other Lebanese politicians.

You also learn from gems like Tishreen that "Syria is targetted for specific purposes," which is good to know for those who thought it was just a random thing.

Keep on reading and you'll discover that the Syrian authorities are also besides themselves with joy because an American "thinker " has supposedly described the president as a national leader. I have a great deal to say about David Lesch (notice that the Syrian media can't even spell the name of its greatest admirers) and his unbelievable book, which I have been literally struggling to read. More on that soon, but let's just say that there seems to be a sudden profusion of American academics who have the hots for the Syrian regime. The feeling is certainly mutual, but then again the regime will apparently welcome any praise with open arms, even when it came from the likes of David Duke a couple of months ago.

But unfortunately, most of the real news from Syria aren't that funny, which is why you don't usually find them in Syrian media. Two of the recently released leaders of the Damascus Spring, Mamoun Homsi and Riad Seif, were crudely detained yesterday. The regime seems determined to keep on using rough tactics and regular harassment to remind its citizens of its absolute power. This comes a week after a journalist, Adel Mahfouz, was arrested for daring to advocate peaceful dialogue following the Danish cartoons reaction folly – a call the Syrian regime interpreted as "insulting public religious sentiment." Now that would have been funny, had the regime's own insults not been so blatant - and not necessarily in the field of religion.

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This video showing British soldiers abusing Iraqi kids has been released on Monday by News of the World, a British tabloid where you normally wouldn't expect to see such coverage. There is also a detailed explanation of events, including some that aren't in the video. That behavior comes from a professional army which claims it is so much better than Americans at "reaching hearts and minds."

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Breaking, that is, in that they may very well be breaking the spirit and the hope of many Syrians who keep waiting in vain for real change to happen. I'm afraid my own hope was already dashed years ago, and I have no expectations from the present crowd (except perhaps for the anticipation that things will get worse).

Farouk Al Sharaa has finally become Vice President, a post he was coveting for years, thus leaving the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs to his deputy Walid Muallem. Worryingly, Sharaa will apparently still be responsible for executing foreign and media policy under the directions of the president,” according to SANA. As for Muallem, he will without any doubt continue in the footsteps of his predecessor and I doubt he will have any significant power himself. (Not that he would have made a difference in improving Syria's foreign policy, mind you.)

Ghazi Kanan's portfolio, the Ministry of Interior, goes to General Bassam Abdel Majeed, ensuring that the military continues to 'defend" the state against its own citizens.

The capable (according to many independent reports) Ibrahim Haddad has been replaced, perhaps being blamed for the dwindling Syrian oil production? The new Minister of Oil is Sufian Alaw.

Riad Nassan Agha, previously Syrian ambassador to the UAE, is the perfect proof that the more you appear on television pedantically praising the leader and the Baath to high heaven, the better your chances for advancement. He becomes Minister of Culture!

The only glimmer of hope that some slight improvement has been made, for those eternal optimists, is the departure of Mehdi Dakhlallah as Minister of (dis)Information. In his place come Muhsen Bilal, who was Syrian ambassador to Madrid and who was the only Syrian official man enough to speak out against the Israeli raid on Syria in October 2003. Many of you will recall that the Syrian government had subsequently declared that Bilal was speaking in his personal capacity and did not represent the official position (which was to run crying to the Security Council, making sure nothing could be interpreted as a threat of self-defense, God forbid).

For those who can bear to visit SANA more than once, the full list of the new cabinet is on the same link.

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Meanwhile, back at the ranch, here are some bits of news about the real world which many (Muslims included) apparently haven't had a chance to observe lately.

Israel has – yet again – publicly announced its intention to officially annex more Palestinian territory (namely the Jordan Valley) and to "encircle the Palestinian state," which would leave the future Palestinian state entirely surrounded by Israel. So much for Israel's (and Kadima's) peace process, for those who were asking. The Quartet doesn't seem to be reading the papers. The Security Council is too busy with the nuclear potential of one country.

Only the Church of England seems to be paying attention to the Israeli occupation lately, as it voted to disinvest from companies whose products are used by the Israeli government in the occupied territories. At the same time, a group including some of Britain's most prominent architects is considering calling for an economic boycott of Israel's construction industry in protest at the building of Israeli settlements and the separation wall in the Occupied Territories. Slightly more effective than boycotting danish, wouldn't you say?

In Jerusalem, freedom to rest in peace is being openly flouted by Israeli authorities. Indeed, it is reported that Israel plans to build a "museum of tolerance" on Muslim graves. Now what's wrong with this sentence?

In Gaza, after having endured repeated Israeli raids and suffered a dozen victims in a week, some Palestinian militants can think of nothing better than to kidnap an Egyptian diplomat. Like that's going to help their cause.

In Iraq, amidst the usual car bombs, coming up to three years after the invasion, nearly two months after the election and still without a government, weeks after journalist Jill Carroll was abducted and ages after the US used chemical weapons in Fallujah without anyone batting an eyelid, virtually every measure of the performance of Iraq's oil, electricity, water and sewerage sectors has fallen below pre-invasion values.

Sami Ramadani, who noticed, takes the time to point out that "the deception that launched the invasion of Iraq now increasingly shapes media coverage" of Iraq, and that "the occupation and divide-and-rule tactics have spawned death squads, torture, kidnappings, chemical attacks, polluted water, depleted uranium, bombardment of civilians, probably more than 100,000 people dead and a relentless deterioration in Iraqis' daily lives." But hey, as Bush and Blair keep telling us, Iraq is free. Lucky Iraqis.


The rest of the world, Muslims included, is too engrossed with Cartoongate to take this in. Outrage? Indignation? Protests? Anyone?

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Having spent some time today looking at dozens of cartoons about the first dozen cartoons, I think I'm developping a serious case of cartoonophobia! Of course, the artistic backlash to the destructive backlash was to be expected, but it's still depressing; here is a typical example of how Muslims (in Arab garb of course) are being portrayed.



Bill Schorr


The Bush administration, helpful as ever, first "investigated" whether extremist groups may have been inciting protesters (duh) but then decided the culprits were (drum roll please) Syria and Iran. Speaking in the (assumingly approving) presence of the Israeli Foreign Minister, Condoleezza Rice said she had no doubt that "Iran and Syria have gone out of their way to inflame sentiments and to use this to their own purposes. And the world ought to call them on it." Yes siree. Now seriously, and ignoring the urge to call the US on a number of other issues, did you ever imagine that these two countries were that powerful? And did you know that the first countries which recalled their ambassadors from Denmark were actually Saudi Arabia and Libya (the latter being the most recent Bush pet)? Now maybe that's really what someone should tell Secretary Rice.

A lot has been made of the three extra cartoons which the Danish Muslim activist, Ahmed Akkari, apparently pretended were part of the original culprits. Not true, he claims, saying that these images were actually clearly presented as items of hate mail sent to his colleagues by right-wing extremists who disapproved of their activism. Akkari also recounts how after having tried in vain to communicate with various Danish officials, and having been rejected several times (even though he was armed with 17,000 signatures on a petition), his group decided that "to be heard, it must come from influential people in the Muslim world."

Moral of the story: activism can produce amazing results. If only it could be used for other issues as well, and if only it could produce more responsible and useful reactions.

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Most of the 12 Danish cartoons are certainly offensive in that they insult the Prophet Muhammad, and in that they imply that Islam is by nature a violent religion. Some are also typically orientalist and incredibly crude (the prophet wears an Indian-style turban with a bomb in it). It would be difficult to believe that the editor responsible for their publication did not imagine they would cause an outcry, to say the least, especially when he had apparently refused to publish cartoons depicting Jesus (another prophet revered by Muslims) a few years ago.

It is also probable that the subsequent publishers of the offending cartoons (in Norway, France, Germany) knew perfectly well they would cause even more outrage. This was downgrading freedom of speech to simple provocation; while it is certainly legally defendable, it is ethically questionable. On both sides of the divide (assuming there are only two sides), there have been hidden agendas which intransigent people have tried to pursue; one side has tried to prove Muslims are insulted and mistreated in the West, while the other tried to prove Muslims are dangerous and inherently aggressive. Sadly, both sides managed to be proved somewhat right. Islam has not been well defended by recent events - nor has, for that matter, the notion of freedom of speech.


Is the Danish government supposed to apologize for the offense caused by the cartoons? It refused to do that in September when the cartoons were originally published, and it was right to do so: the Danish government is not responsible for the country's media. Unfortunately, the notion of an independent media is still one that seems incomprehensible in the Arab world, through no fault of the people. The problem is that many Western governments (including the Danish one) do not bring up freedom of speech and freedom of expression when they condemn positions that are deemed to be anti-Semitic (that doesn't include Arabs, of course, because they are not considered to be Semites for some odd reason). The resulting perception for many is that while anti-Semitism is off-limits and sometimes punishable by law, Islamophobia is not, which might explain why more and more Muslims are paranoid.

The Danish government should have foreseen the potential for trouble and should have been more flexible and understanding with the initial complaint logged by Danish Muslims. At the very least, the Danish prime minister should have agreed to meet with the ambassadors from Muslim countries last October, but he unwisely and undiplomatically denied their request.

Still, if I had a bone to pick with the Danish government, it would be for actions for which it was truly responsible, such as its decision (for instance) to have participated in the invasion of Iraq and to have kept over 500 troops since then. I would have a bone to pick with the Danish parliament's decision to extend the troops' presence in Iraq and with the reprehensible actions of some Danish troops with Iraqis.


Does the offense caused by the cartoons justify the violent reactions seen so far? Certainly not! In fact, the latter have outraged me a thousand times more than the original cartoons could ever have! Even the most religious Muslims or the most scholarly Islamists will be hard pressed to find a validation for this violence in the texts of Islamic law or in the Quran. This is not self-defense. If anything, the reaction of some Muslims around the world has "proved" that Muslims are violent and that Islam is intolerant – seemingly making this a self-fulfilling prophecy. I find nothing Islamic in these uncivilized displays of aggression and ignorance.

I was particularly incensed by the theatrics of some Palestinian militants (interestingly, not from Hamas or religious parties) in front of the EU embassy in Gaza, threatening violence if the Danish government did not apologize; while Muslims in Palestine have as much affinity with their religion as anyone else and have the right to feel offended, surely they have a lot more pressing issues than the cartoons. The same goes for the rioters in a number of Muslim countries. As for the signs seen during the London demonstrations, they are totally unacceptable and can only be interpreted as incitement to violence. No Muslim I know would identify with the notion that someone who insults Islam deserves to be punished, let alone beheaded! Nonsense. The Islam I know washes its hands of such thugs.

All these scenes have given the media plenty of opportunities in the past few days to portray the fanaticism of the demonstrators (and consequently Muslims), choosing the most shocking and scary images to drive home a point: as example, see this Rasputin-like photo in The Daily Telegraph on Monday. I really don't think this young man was physically representative of the Lebanese rioters, but a picture is worth a thousand words.



It is important to remember, however, that while some protests have indeed been fanatical and violent, they were relatively limited in scope and still only represent a tiny minority of Muslims. Most would not dream of taking things to this extreme and totally dissociate themselves from these actions.


Does the offense call for a boycott of Danish products? Not in my opinion; not only is that uncalled for, but it is as ridiculous as Americans pouring bottles of French wine down the drain when France refused to sanction the invasion of Iraq. I don't think that switching from Lurpak butter to other brands will have much of an effect on the portrayal of Islam abroad. Furthermore, the Danish people are not to blame for the actions of one editor. The case here is very different from the boycott of South African products until the end of apartheid, or from the boycott of Israeli products: in these two cases, it is believed that a good portion of the people of these countries had (and still have) a clear responsibility and an impact on the actions of their governments, and it was thought economic pressure could help redress iniquities. A boycott of Danish products therefore seems futile – especially when we come back to the original issue of freedom of speech (and not freedom to oppress or dispossess).


If the Danish government is believed to be responsible for the actions of some of its citizens, what does this mean for the governments of Syria and of Lebanon, and of the countries where damage was caused to a number of European embassies? There are so many parts to this question. In my mind, there is absolutely no doubt that the Syrian regime is responsible for the damage done to the embassies in Damascus (especially that of Chile, which has the misfortune of sharing a building with the Danes and the Swedes). You don't need to be a Syria expert to know that nothing of that magnitude can take place in Syria without the permission AND the encouragement of the regime. And you don't need to be a Syria expert to realize the absurdity of recalling a non-resident ambassador to Denmark when Syria needs all the EU contacts it can get!

I am sure that the demonstrators were genuinely angry, but they were also worked up into a frenzy by rumours; indeed, many had received text messages claiming that Danes would meet that weekend in a Copenhagen square to burn Qurans! While I have no evidence to point fingers, I wonder who started these rumours and who stands to gain from the consequences. I do not dispute the fact that most Syrians are religious, but I do not recognize such mindless fundamentalism. (Unlike in Beirut, thankfully, no church was even touched.) Just as Syrians "happened" to storm the American embassy a few years ago, "overwhelming" the security forces, they were clearly permitted to show those Danes a lesson and were treated with unrealistic kid gloves by the police! If the Syrian regime expects us to believe the people were out of control, its stupidity is truly astounding.

As for the problems in Beirut, I know that some of my Lebanese friends will disagree with my view that while this certainly started as an organized demonstration with dubious goals, underlying sectarian feelings did come out at one point (worryingly turning the event into a Muslim vs. Christian clash), and it could not be blamed solely on Syria. This is not a good omen for the future and brings back too many bad memories.


Are Arab regimes taking advantage of the situation? Of course they are. How convenient for them to fuel the people's anger and to "allow" them to express their frustration. How convenient to have "proof" of the people's fundamentalism as a reminder of the regimes' "moderation." It's either us or the Muslim Brotherhood, they want to tell us all, which is why hordes shouting "Allahu akbar" really serves their agendas. These are the same regimes which did not hesitate to violently crush demonstrations in support of the Intifada, when millions of Arabs (and Muslims) truly and spontaneously took to the streets to vent their anger at Israeli actions.

How convenient for some of these regimes to demand respect for religion: does Saudi Arabia have a leg to stand on when it forbids the manifestation of any religion other than Islam? Is it respectful when no church, bible or crucifix can be found there? How does that fit with Islam's tenet that "there shall be no compulsion in religion?" And, by the way, would the Saudis have recalled their ambassador had the offending publication been American? How convenient, of course, that the boycott is being targetted towards relatively inoffensive countries like Denmark.


Have I been as annoying as Rumsfeld by posing and answering my own questions? You bet, so here is a final thought. Following Gebran Tueni's murder in December, I simply wrote in this blog one of my favorite Voltaire quotes, which I think represents my stance today: "I do not agree with what you say, but I will defend your right to say it."

There are so many other, better ways to explain the tenets of Islam to those who hold a particularly skewed view of it, based on the actions of a minority. Dialogue is certainly wiser than diatribe. And while some people choose to take offense in varying degrees at insignificant (albeit insensitive) cartoons, I will continue to direct my outrage at other issues in the Middle East and around the world which directly affect human lives.


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I've been in Qatar for the last week attending Al Jazeera's forum, about which I'll write later, and flew back to a storm of outrage and protests. Like many people (or so I hope), I am outraged by the real disgrace of the past few days and furious that human tragedy should have been practically ignored while mere images became the focus of an increasingly organized fury. Anyone concerned with the condition of Muslims should have been taken by the tragedy of the Egyptian ferry which sank in the Red Sea. I will mention the other issues in a later post.

It is unthinkable that some 1,000 people could die so anonymously as an amorphous mass, after having spent years toiling abroad (probably like slaves) because their own country could not provide a chance for dignified employment. It is outrageous that thousands of anxious relatives should be treated like potential trouble-makers and made to face riot police in full gear, instead of being cared for and treated with kindness. It is shocking that instead of gathering heartbroken people in small groups and attempting to ease their pain and their trauma, Egyptian authorities made them endure a slide show (a slide show!) parading the numerous corpses so that identification could be made.

This poor Egyptian woman, waiting for a ferry that will never come, should have been given all the compassion and respect due to a distressed human being. Like her partners in grief, however, she suffers alone.





The miraculous rescue of Mohamed Hassanein, a 5-year old boy who spent some 36 hours in the water after having lost his whole family, is the only heart-warming picture we can take away from this tragedy.



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Before we turn to Hamas and to the demand that it renounces violence, let us pause on some news few in the media bothered to cover.

On Thursday, Israeli soldiers shot dead Aya Al Astal, a 9-year old Palestinian girl in Gaza. The army explained: "the person" (she) was carrying a large bag and didn't stop when asked. For that, she was shot in the neck.

This comes soon after Munadel Abu Alya, a 13-year old Palestinian boy, was shot dead on Monday by the Israeli army near Ramallah.



So have we all gotten over the shock of the Palestinian election earthquake yet? I'm not sure I believe people who say they weren't surprised at all; yes, we all expected big changes in the makeup of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and we all expected Fatah to take a bruising, but certainly not this bad. We understand why it happened, however, and I think most have mixed feelings about it: on the one hand, the ruling guys finally got what they deserved; on the other hand, well, the replacement turned out to be Hamas!

"Obviously, people were not happy with the status quo," said Middle East expert extraordinaire George Bush. You can say that again. In fact, the ruling party Fatah only received 43 seats, an embarrassingly low results relative to Hamas's 76 seats.

Condoleezza Rice acknowledged the elections had been conducted fairly by all accounts – fairly, that is, if you disregard the fact that out of 100,000 eligible Jerusalem voters, only 6,300 Palestinians were allowed to vote there.

(You would also have to forget the minor detail of Palestinians still being under occupation. And that of Palestinian refugees the world over being forbidden to vote.) That's kind of her, considering that the US and Israel consider Hamas to be a terrorist organization, and that both refuse to even talk to it before it reneges on its refusal to accept the state of Israel. In fact, the US is even threatening to cut aid to the Palestinian Authority, and the EU has also wondered what to do now.

All this brings up interesting questions, given the multitude of groups and individuals in the region who were previously designated as terrorists and who ended up being statesmen – and even men of peace, apparently. I don't just mean the PLO of course, but also the numerous Jewish terrorist groups acting even before the creation of Israel. When does a past "terrorist" become a "freedom fighter" or something even vaguer? How much time must elapse?

Just as interestingly, since advocating the destruction of another state (which Hamas calls for until now) is obviously not acceptable, why has it never been an issue with the Likud? Granted, the Likud platform does not call for the destruction of Palestine, obviously, since there isn't a Palestinian state left to destroy in the first place. It does, however, state that there will never be a Palestinian state west of the river Jordan (but ever so kindly allows the Palestinians "self-rule" as long as it's not an independent or sovereign state). Given that a multitude of UN Security Council resolutions and peace plans devised by the Quartet call upon a two-state solution (and that is the official position of the United States), and given that Likud categorically refuses that option, why did the US not threaten to cut all aid to Israel when Likud came to power (more than once) still hanging on to its "Nile to the Euphrates" fantasy?

Be that as it may, the reality is that the spotlight is on Hamas now. More precisely, the spotlight is on Hamas in its various capacities: is it Hamas the "militant" group, Hamas the "opposite of Fatah" group, or Hamas the "Islamist" group which won the Palestinian elections? Which of them will form a government and which of them will take a break? (Or will there still be a Hamas/IRA and a Hamas/Sinn Fein at work simultaneously?)

A combination of the above is probably true. The Palestinian vote, from what we've been observing in the past few days, has been anti-Fatah, anti-corruption and anti-Israel – more so, I dare say, than being mostly an Islamist vote. Both the PA and Israel should have seen this coming; the more they oppressed the Palestinian people, the less they saw a reason to wait for crumbs thrown in their direction. Israeli society should start thinking very carefully about its own elections in March, and how effective its past and present leaders have been in securing Israel's long-term security. The sooner Israeli society starts taking responsibility for the plight of Palestinians, the sooner it will feel more secure (and really democratic, and humane).

Hamas's Islamist dimension is one that will have other countries in the region watching in a mixture of awe and fear. How much of its Islamism will Hamas try to impose on Palestinian society? Its behaviour in that respect may be an indicator of how other Islamist groups are viewed in the region. Certainly a phenomenon to watch.

I'm sure the region has been amused by the fact that democratic elections (as democratic as they could have been under occupation) have shown an overwhelming rejection of American candidates (such as Allawi in Iraq and Dahlan in Palestine). Here's an idea: maybe the US should start supporting all the Islamist candidates everywhere – that's a way to make sure the liberals win.

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I don't want to say anything on the speech. Nothing new of course. But the marketing material alone deserves a response.




Apparently, grammatical errors or horrors notwithstanding, "defending Syria is national right and duty." Fair enough. Or is it? Maybe omitting the article was a Freudian slip; maybe the creator of this slogan really wanted to keep the notion vague. Is it a right? Our right? Your right?

Has the Syrian regime given Syrian citizens that right in the first place, before it imposes it as a duty? Or any other rights for that matter?

If I were to be made responsible for the survival of a project at work, I could not be totally segregated from the decision making process. The project manager and his/her pet assistants cannot be allowed to make a mess of things and expect the team (which had been warning of impending disaster) to repair the damage when they screw up. It is doubtful that the team could even be capable of suddenly picking up the pieces. Troubleshooters aren't always effective, especially when they weren't called in time. That is a basic Management 101 lesson. Elementary.

Likewise, if defending Syria were both my right and my duty, I would have needed some degree of power to initiate action or instigate change. At the very least, I would have needed to have the illusion of power to make me feel I mattered. Right now, the only people with such powers are those that have pushed Syria into this corner in the first place; shouldn't we rather be talking about their accountability? Their duty?

Be that as it may, to be held accountable for the country's defense, citizens need many things. They need to be living in dignity, to be well fed, well educated, well employed, well taken care of when they are ill, robbed, abused or cheated.

Citizens need some power - the power to vote in the people they believe are most capable. Citizens need to have a choice, and not have to depend on the "choice" of the Baath party (or of any other single party). Citizens need to know there is a limit (say two?) to the number of terms in which an official can hold office.

Citizens need to have the power to take action against corrupt, unjust or plain incompetent officials. Citizens need to have the power to use the media to crucify, if necessary, those who abuse their positions. Citizens need to have the power to make officials leave their posts when they digress.

Citizens need to have the power to propose changes to the laws of the country, to demand that parliamentarians reflect the wishes (nay, orders) of their respective constituencies' majority, to expect that the MPs will vote accordingly in parliament sessions, and to imagine that parliament discussions have a real effect on government.

Citizens need to know that there is a real balance between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary branches of government. Citizens need to know that the government represents them.

If citizens are to be held accountable for the defense of the country, then the ruling class will first have to be held accountable for its (mis)management. Especially when citizens didn't have a choice in the matter. So let's first talk about the regime's duties … before we even get to its rights.

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I don't think it's the Baath per se that's responsible, but isn't Emad Ajjaj's imagery so very suggestive of Syria's sorry reality?



Emad Ajjaj, Al Ghad

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I got somewhat emotional today watching Riad Seif and Mamoun Homsi being greeted on their release from jail. They looked so much older, but also so much bigger than the small, small brutes who were so scared of their words that they threw them in jail. I am so glad they are finally with their families now, as are the other three prisoners of conscience released today: Fawaz Tello, Walid Bunni, and Habib Issa.

I got even more emotional thinking that Aref Dalila, amongst many other prisoners of conscience, remains in jail in very bad conditions. The Syrian regime fears the word, especially the patriotic, eloquent word, and Dr. Dalila is the most patriotic and eloquent one of us all; this is partly why he got double the sentence.

This blog has never really been the place to mention personal issues, but I must say I have always felt a special link with each of these three brave men: Mamoun Homsi, who happens to be a relative of mine, Riad Seif, with whom I remember discussing, in his office (both of us well aware of the Mukhabarat's ears listening to our every word) how things should proceed for activists a week before Hafez Assad died, and Aref Dalila, who I proudly consider a friend and who taught me so much about internal Syrian affairs in the couple of years preceding his imprisonment.

Naturally, I await – no, I demand - the release of Aref Dalila. But even that will not be enough. Should we be grateful for the release of Riad Seif and Mamoun Homsi and our Damascus Spring detainees? They should have never been jailed in the first place. Furthermore, with their full jail term nearly over, it is common knowledge that they would have been released several months ago (with a jail year counting for about 9 months) had they been "normal" prisoners. So let's think before we jump with joy, or, God forbid, gratitude. We owe nothing to the Syrian regime; rather, they owe us everything.

Our prisoners of conscience must first of all receive a public, official apology for having been wrongfully and illegally detained (and illegally stripped of their parliamentarian immunity, something Seif and Homsi actually took seriously). The Syrian regime must apologize. Then, the Syrian regime must reinstate them in their positions. Finally, the Syrian regime must pay compensation for physical and psychological harm done throughout these years.

Of course, knowing present circumstances in Syria, that's asking for a lot, and yet it's asking for a minimum. I haven't even mentioned martial law and all the other injustices imposed on Syria since 1963. Demanding their removal is our duty; accepting the status quo is no longer an option.

Finally, I must say that I am outraged at what Joshua Landis has dared to write in his royalist blog, namely that Dr. Dalila was jailed because he called on Alawites not to follow the Assads. What a load of rubbish. Unlike Landis, Dr. Dalila does not (and never did) fall into petty sectarian "analysis," dedicating his time and sacrificing his freedom and health to speak tirelessly against the abuses of the regime, the economic and social disparities, and the injustice and brutality which rule in Syria. He has never spoken of sects.

Also, repeating that Aref Dalila's or Riad Seif's release would "enhance the image of the US in Syria" is ridiculous. If Josh does not know anything about our brave prisoners of conscience, then he should ask people who know, rather than guess how "optimists" or "pessimists" will interpret it. And he should certainly not simply repeat nonsense posted as "comments" and try to pass them off as expertise. If there's one thing worse than total, inexplicable bias, it is bias coupled with ignorance.

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Paul Bremer's memoirs are out in the US this week, and from the reports I've seen so far, he claims that everyone else but him is to blame for what went wrong in Iraq. There are many details coming out about who did what (according to him), and an interesting one about Syria – and not about supporting the (mostly Sunni) insurgency.

As reported in The Daily Telegraph today, Bremer accuses Bashar Assad of having tried to convince Ayatollah Sistani to wage a holy war against the Americans, in a manner similar to the Shia uprising against the British in 1920.

Bremer said "the news was passed to him by Mowaffak al-Rubaie, a senior Shia politician involved in negotiations with the ayatollah. The Syrian leader had apparently recalled the Shia-led uprising against the British in 1920 and urged the Shia to repeat history."

The article continues: The news "stunned" the US administration in Iraq. "This was an act of extraordinary irresponsibility from Syria's president," Mr Bremer writes. "We had good intelligence showing that many insurgents and terrorists were coming into Iraq through Syria."

But the allegation was far more serious, he says. "This message from Assad essentially incited Shia rebellion. If he were to succeed, the coalition would face an extremely bloody two-front uprising, costing thousands of lives."

I think what's next is predictable: the Syrian regime will claim that a) it's not true, but b) it was done by Abdel Halim Khaddam, which is why he was sidelined and why he subsequently defected, bitter and lonely, having made a mess of Iraq on top of having stopped democracy and forbidden a free economy - all by himself.

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You'll forgive me for breaking the vigil over Sharon's health status and for diverting from thinking about the frantic media's panicked questions – namely, what could possibly happen to the "peace process" after Saint Ariel's departure from politics. Oddly enough, Syrian politics keep catching my attention.

Am I the only one who found today's events very strange? I haven't yet heard any comments on the unannounced travels today. First the unexpected visit of Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal to Damascus; that in itself wasn't so strange, even if it was sudden, but what followed certainly was. It is certainly not usual diplomacy for a foreign minister to go to another country just to announce a sudden summit and to bring back the president of his host country to his own. Farouk Sharaa's fake smile was even more fake today, and there was a certain je ne sais quoi in the air, perhaps a sense of reality hitting him like a ton of bricks.

Why did Saud go all the way to Damascus just to announce the summit? (Notice how every little meeting is now a "summit.") Why didn't Bashar just go to Jeddah? Was Saudi Arabia putting him in a fait accompli situation because he had claimed he was too "busy" to go? Had he not answered the summons in a satisfactory way? In any case, he wasn't too busy to stop off in Sharm El Sheikh on his way back to meet Hosni Mubarak – unescorted this time.

I still think the Saudis are not keen on going all the way, if only because they are not quite convinced of the feasibility of a Khaddam & Co scenario (or of any other). I'm sure that could change when a workable alternative has been found, one which suits the interested powers of course, not necessarily the Syrian people. In the meantime, they seem to prefer the idea of a weakened Syrian regime – but one which starts to do as it is told, once and for all. It is only a matter of time, and we will see whether the very vague Saudi (and Egyptian, but they are less important now) wish that Lebanese and Syrian media should stop escalating matters will be carried out. More importantly, is Sharaa really going to be interviewed by the UN commission? I just don't see it happening with Assad and will be the first surprised if it happens. The time when this could have been presented as a courtesy call has come and gone; meeting the UN means Bashar has capitulated.

As for Khaddam, he seems to still have a lot of things up his sleeve. My initial feeling about his coup de force last week has been strengthened; this is a lot bigger than just Hariri, although it is of course Hariri's assassination that triggered the sequence of events (or, as I've repeatedly maintained, it is the extension of Lahoud's term and the complete mismanagement of foreign affairs that started it all). I don't see a coup d'état (nor do I hope for one, as it would change nothing), nor a popular uprising – in fact, even the opposition in Syria couldn't wait to distance itself from Khaddam, obviously. But I do feel that something has shaken the regime and weakened it considerably, for the first time. It remains to be seen what will be the coup de grace.

Without wasting time on it, I should mention that the usual non-Syrian "Syria experts" have continued to say the most ludicrous things over the past week. To respond to but one thing, Syrians will actually still be talking about Khaddam for years (they still talk about Ali Douba and Hikmat Chehabi, amongst others, for crying out loud!). This is a story that concerns everyone, and it is an unprecedented turn of affairs. True, there were defections in Syria's political past, but none after a ruthless regime had been in power for over 35 years. Not even after Rifaat Assad's exile did people dare to talk about cracks in the regime – perhaps because there weren't really any.

And to mention another thing, while we're at it, Khaddam certainly did not try to impose Baathists in the last major reshuffle, only to be surprised by Bashar's "liberals"; on the contrary, and I know this for a fact without being able to talk openly about the people involved, Khaddam thought his choice for Minister of Economy – an independent liberal who worked for years in the US and Europe – was a done deal. Jamal Khaddam called the man in question ten minutes before the new government was going to be announced, asked him where he was (he was driving home), and told him to turn on the radio to hear his name. Ten minutes later, the government was announced – and he wasn't in it.

That doesn't mean Khaddam was the democratizing force he claims he was. As long as it served his purpose, he was more than happy to participate in the crackdown on the Damascus Spring, and on any attempt to spread civil society's word. But where Khaddam differs from the rest of the thugs abusing the country is that he did understand the international scene better, and he did benefit Syria more during his time. Small consolation.

The best comment on this whole Khaddam-Assad duel of sorts has come from Angry Arab, who wrote a few days ago that in this affair, he feels like Henry Kissinger observing the Iraq-Iran war … he wants neither to win! Touché As'ad!

By the way, the English text of Khaddam's interview with Asharq Al Awsat on Friday is here (as I've noticed a lot of less than faithful translations). The Newsweek interview, where Christopher Dickey couldn't help but start with the subject of Sharon (and of "Hezbollah's relentless campaign of terror and attrition" – against the occupier in their own country, but I digress) is here.

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So here we were, minding our own business, thinking the excitement had gone out of the whole Syria-Lebanon affair and that the year had seen every possible development there was. Thanks to Abdel Halim Khaddam who decided to make a few waves and keep us entertained, we had the farcical session of parliament in Damascus today to send off 2005 with a big bang.

I noticed that most Lebanese observers (bloggers included) only focused on Khaddam's statements regarding Hariri, considering the interview a sound indictment of the Syrian president, and a clever move by the Hariri clan. I think they're missing a lot, given that this is an unprecedented turn of events in internal Syrian affairs, and Lebanon is only a part of it. That said, I think it’s a pity that Khaddam should have chosen Al Arabiya to make these revelations; undoubtedly, the Saudi connection (and of course consequently the Hariri connection) takes away from the independence of the endeavour. Also, it's a pity the interview was not done by a more capable (and less robotic) journalist, who could have probed when needed and directed and organized the conversation.

Khaddam should have also thought twice about sitting in the very obvious luxury of his Avenue Foch residence as he bemoaned the poverty of Syrian people forced to look for food in garbage cans, or as he wondered about the origin of the riches – in the billions of dollars – of other Syrian officials.

This interview was very long, and the full version has just been broadcast. I think most people have already reacted to the shorter, hour and a half version shown yesterday. I also need to go back to listen to the details, there were many interesting revelations (most of which seem credible). Several Syrians with whom I spoke today highly enjoyed Khaddam's criticism of Farouk Sharaa, agreeing with his assessment of Syrian foreign policy (or lack thereof). For me, the most important parts (and the reason why the Syrian leadership must have gone crazy) were those dealing with the inner workings of the regime, and the influences on (and the temper of) the president. It is not simply because Khaddam spoke of threats made against Hariri that the regime staged the incredible (even by Syrian standards) session of parliament today.

If you thought Syrian presidential "elections" are incredibly close to unanimity, with landslide victories in the high 90 percents, then you will find them practically democratic when compared with today's parliamentary session where 100% of the parliamentarians, by some strange coincidence, instinctively knew what to say in total agreement with one another.

One after the other, these sycophants (they aren't really worthy of the name "parliamentarians") used their most poetic tones to condemn Khaddam and demand that he be tried for high treason. High treason? If Khaddam's crimes indeed qualify him for high treason, then doesn't that put the whole regime – and many many of their accomplices – in the same accusation chair? Does the regime really believe this is something the people can swallow?

Suddenly, these MPs have all noticed how many properties Khaddam accumulated in Syria, how much money his children made, and even how nuclear waste was buried on Syrian soil by the Khaddams. Now they notice. That's a lot of information, a lot of corruption, and a lot of treason in one go. So much, in fact, that some MPs took some very questionable liberties with verses from the Quran, changing them to fit their descriptions of Khaddam. This was a very unremarkable day in the history of unremarkable days in Syrian internal affairs.

Strangely, the same MPs hadn't noticed all these seemingly evident crimes during Khaddam's tenure in various official positions. As far as I can remember, certainly since I've been a child, people would give anything to get near Abu Jamal and Um Jamal, or their children for that matter, as they do with most high "responsibles" in Syria. But without any doubt, apart from the immediate presidential family, the Khaddams were in a special category.

Just as strangely, or even more strangely now that their eyesight has been suddenly restored, none of these MPs happened to notice any other Syrian official having big houses or taking money from the Syrian people. Nope. It was just Khaddam. And it was just Khaddam who stood in the way of reform, apparently – which is the only good news to come out of this parliamentary session, since it now means real reform can immediately start at galloping speed now that the impediment has been removed.

I was sorry to see Lebanese politicians and commentators today give effusive thanks for Khaddam's position and declarations, neglecting to take all the above considerations into account. If they only care about their own affairs, they make a mockery of their calls for democracy and freedom, of which the Syrian people are just as worthy as they are. In the long run, it does not serve Lebanon to hail any person simply because he or she publicly dissents from the official Syrian line.

There will be a lot of time in 2006 to talk about the repercussions of Khaddam's defection. May it be a good year for everyone.

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A Lebanese friend sent me this cartoon of Santa visiting Lebanon, so that we could all be jolly on top of being worried. That's the spirit!




Santa Claus visits Lebanon

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"Je ne suis pas d'accord avec ce que vous dites, mais je me battrai pour que vous ayez le droit de le dire."

Voltaire

(I do not agree with what you say, but I will fight for your right to say it.)


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It's not clear why anyone in Syria should be relieved that UNSC Resolution 1636 was "watered-down" with the help of a number of countries. Firstly, it doesn't need to be any tougher or threaten to eventually impose sanctions: since it already falls under Chapter VII, the "or else" implication is there by default. Secondly, removing the explicit threat of sanctions merely ensured that the vote would be unanimous. It wouldn't have mattered anyway, of course, as an adopted resolution is legally binding no matter how high the majority (such as, for instance, UNSC Resolution 242), whether or not it falls under Chapter VII. Thirdly, it makes it easier to dictate sanctions in the following resolution, sanctions stronger than the threatened ones which might have been included in 1636.

I'm sure I'm not the only Syrian despairing at the performance of the Foreign Minister at the Security Council. Perhaps he and his bosses still have not figured out that it may have been better to start addressing world opinion and to avoid wasting time with ridiculous analogies whose only impact was to demonstrate they had nothing else to say. The British Foreign Secretary was equally pathetic, but clearly in a better position to try – and fail - to sound interesting and intelligent; if anything was medieval, it was their pointless spat.

Was Sharaa going for sincerity, credibility or mercy when he reminded Straw that he telephoned him after the July bombings in London? Why did he suggest a closed meeting with the members of the Council so that evidence of Syrian cooperation with the Mehlis team could be presented? If there is such evidence, it should be made public (rather than the bizarre story on members of the commission's eventual return to Syria as tourists and the discussion on who would pay for the hotels). There is so much to say about this pathetic performance, and much to say about what Syria should be doing right now. Suffice it to say, for the moment, that this is unacceptable behaviour which doesn't even fall under the category of diplomacy.

Syrians used to be angry because of the regime's brutality and injustice; now, they are also angry because of its incompetence. It has, rather literally, added even more insult to injury.

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Are we supposed to be grateful for the sudden "rectification" of issues that shouldn't have happened in the first place? I'm sure the 190 Syrian prisoners of conscience whose release was announced on Wednesday are relieved to be out of jail, but it's hard to accept the explanation for their release, just as it was to accept the explanation (if any) for their incarceration. Apparently, it has absolutely nothing to do with internal and external pressures, no Siree. The timing is purely coincidental.

SANA, with its usual clarity, explained that this amnesty was "in line with the comprehensive reform policy that aims at strengthening national cohesion which constitutes the basis of our society texture and serves our national interests." This is reform? And this is what SANA says comes "within a series of similar steps that Syria has taken so far in recent years with aim of strengthening the internal front and consolidating the national dialogue"? What steps? Wouldn't national dialogue be more consolidated if people speaking their minds weren't thrown into jail?

In a journalistic scoop which SANA shares with us, there are apparently "more steps and measures to come in that connection on the basis that the homeland embraces all." At the risk of raining on their parade, this sounds an awful lot like the promise that a big step would be taken at the Baath Party Congress.

The three Syrians whose illegal arrest and imprisonment continues to symbolize the regime's response to the Damascus Spring – Riad Seif, Mamoun Homsi and Aref Dalila – remain in jail, along with many others.

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I may have been too confident when I spoke last week of Syria's desperate 11th hour attempts to gather sympathy and support around the world; "11th hour" presupposes a window of opportunity, no matter how small. But as I watch, with increasing disgust, the amateurish performance of Syrian officials on numerous television channels, and observe the hasty shuttle on which some "diplomats" have embarked (notably to the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council, beginning with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia), it's clear the 11th hour has already come and gone.

There is a daily news program on Syrian television called The 25th Hour. For a long time, my husband and I attempted, admittedly rather childishly and never with a straight face, to make sense of the term; not surprisingly, we never managed but ended up using the term, to our amusement, to describe a number of Syrian "initiatives." It occurs to me today that The 25th Hour in fact accurately describes the Syrian regime's conduct; indeed, it only seems to react when it is already too late, beyond the 11th hour. And it's not funny anymore. While Syrian officials continue to argue that the Mehlis report is full of contradictions, inaccuracies and faults, most others have moved on to discuss the implications of the Security Council meeting on Monday (where it is assumed a resolution of warning will be passed) and the choices facing the Syrian regime.

I find it incredible that Walid Muallem, whose words of warning to Hariri are partly transcribed in the Mehlis report, should have been chosen to embody the Syrian charm offensive (really a supplication round) with the Gulf leaders, who of course were on excellent terms with Hariri. But again, how typical of Syrian regime behaviour to use its tried and tested loyal men, how typical that it remains completely oblivious to the situation. At least Muallem may get a slightly warmer welcome (or, better put, a less cold one) than Farouk Shara can expect in New York. Syrian diplomacy is really not worthy of the name anymore – and yes, it used to be, many years ago.

In the meantime, the opposition is making very reasonable (some would say too reasonable) demands in an attempt to defend the country while calling the regime to account. Nobody is under the illusion that the Syrian people can escape unscathed from the confrontation between an erratic American regime and an erratic Syrian regime.

As for the inquiry set up by Syria to investigate the assassination of Rafik Hariri (it's a wonder they didn't think of that back in February), there is already a strong lead: yesterday, on Al Jazeera, the Syrian ambassador to the United Arab Emirates declared that the Mossad had assassinated Rafik Hariri. There you go.

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When UNSC Resolution 1559 was passed, the Syrian regime had gloated that it was a victory because it didn't mention Syria by name; it's fair to say that there is little possibility of that on Monday, when the vote on the post-Mehlis report resolution is expected. But the Syrian regime is still hoping that Russia and China will veto, and that the only Arab state currently in the Security Council, Algeria, will vote against it. One might wonder why Syria would be counting on Algeria, when it had itself voted for UNSC Resolution 1441 to the dismay of many observers. At the time, most people were still not convinced that Iraq had WMDs; today, however, many more people are convinced that Syria has something to hide.

There's been mostly the same old stories we've known for years, and which fail to add much to understanding the current picture. Often, there is a complete misreading of the situation, even by relatively qualified journalists; for instance, The Washington Post, trying to illustrate what it believes is "the adage in the Middle East" that "if the government survives a crisis, it can claim victory," chooses Saddam's "crisis" of the 1991 Gulf War and compares it to Hafez Assad's "crisis" of the 1973 war! Clearly, the writers have absolutely no clue about what the October War meant for Syria, and about the initial legitimacy it brought to Assad's regime.

Some of you may be surprised to hear that there are some Americans writing from Syria who are not mere apologists for the regime (really), and who try (not too successfully, but at least they try) to paint a more realistic picture of the mood in the country. In the Los Angeles Times, Matthew Longo's "Hating the regime, fearing Uncle Sam" at least acknowledges that hating one party doesn't translate into outright support of the other (and vice versa) – no matter what you've heard. But it seems the generalizations can't be helped: you will still read that people in Syria (and in the entire Middle East, in fact) really like their leaders and only blame the people around them for the corruption, oppression, blunders, etc. Sounds familiar? In the same Washington Post article, the writers claim that "people often make a distinction between him and the unpopular government" and that "he has shorn his rule of the iconography so familiar to his father." Really? Are the reporters actually in Syria and are they using their eyes? I think it still hasn't occurred to non-Syrians offering us their analysis and reports that they still might not be getting the full story from the "natives" and that the vast majority of people will still not dare criticize the president to someone outside their closest circle.

In the meantime, upholding its noble goals of freedom of expression and freedom of information, American media (and I don't mean 'big" media) is trying to educate its readers on all things Syrian in self-righteous editorials and op-eds expressing shock at foreign interference in other countries, and the criminality of assassinations. (When it's done by Syria, that is.) Thus, you can now read about the Syrian predicament in numerous newspapers, including such renowned sources of international political analysis as Louisvile, Kentucky, or State College, Pennsylvania, or Denver, Colorado, or Columbus, Ohio or Milwaukee, Wisconsin, amongst others; alternatively, you can stick to souces inside Syria who will tell you how much Syrians support the regime and how they will all kill each other if it crumbles. But if you only stick to these two extremes, you will not be aware that there is a middle ground, and that more Syrians stand in it.

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I was at the BBC World studios during the Security Council meeting with Detlev Mehlis today, spending my time off the air switching between numerous channels on the desk, first following the Reuters feed, and then surfing between the main news channels to see what they found worth captioning. Someone who assumed (wrongly) I was interested advised me to regularly check the live feed from the Foreign Office, where a press conference with Jack Straw and Saad Hariri was expected.

It would have never occurred to me that one of the TV channels, namely Al Arabiya, would actually find Hariri's appearance to be more newsworthy than the session at the UN, cutting to live coverage from London! That it happened exactly when the Syrian ambassador, Faisal Meqdad, was delivering his statement will add to Syrian paranoia; is that justified, or was it purely a coincidence? Al Arabiya also saw it fit to bring a commentator right after Hariri's appearance, before turning its attention once more to New York. You may be pleased to know that Hariri is eventually going back home: ("I think I am going back to the Lebanon because I have to go back to the Lebanon. It is a risk we take and as we work in politics in Lebanon there is a risk to take and I am willing to take it. So I will go back to be among the people who voted for me." Wow. (Does anyone know, by the way, why Rafik Hariri's son speaks English and French relatively badly?)

Mehlis's disclosure that credible threats had been received by the commission, and the way his eyebrows shot up when Syrian Ambassador Faisal Meqdad complained about the report's allegations of misleading statements from the Syrian Foreign Ministry were the only points of real interest today, in addition to Mehlis's suggestion that Syria should conduct its own investigation to fill the gaps. (I can't see much good coming out of this, and I'm cringing in advance at the OJ-style jokes and cartoons that may be coming.) When you recall how the media argued with Mehlis (in fact even attacked him, rather than questioned him) during his press conference on Friday, you can only imagine what the Syrian investigator will face.

If you haven't seen it yet, go to The Guardian and read Brian Whitaker's well written answer to his own question: Could Syria have been so stupid?

On a lighter side, while I take it no Syrians will be naming their newborn sons Detlev any time soon, a Lebanese friend informed me today that this may become quite the rage – at least in Sidon (Hariri's hometown), where he's heard it has already happened. I still don't know whether to believe him.

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I hate long posts, but in order to make up for this long absence, I've included here some of the comments I made this afternoon during a general meeting at Chatham House, where I was part of a panel with my colleagues Nadim Shehadi (Middle East Program) and Elizabeth Wilmshurst (International Law Program), and the Syrian ambassador to London. Since I don't generally read from texts, this is not a verbatim, but rather an indication of some of the points I made before the general debate. This meeting was held just before the UN Security Council session on the Mehlis report.


No observer of Syrian politics could have been surprised by the regime's reaction to the Mehlis report; a strong denial of the accusations was to be expected, as were the claims that this was purely a politicized report. Sadly, the more Syria cries it is innocent, the more people are willing to believe the contrary.

There is a problem with official Syrian reactions to the report. Even though we have become accustomed to its frequent incoherence and indecisiveness, it is still intriguing to note that the Syrian regime has promised to cooperate fully with the continuing investigation under Detlev Mehlis, while simultaneously calling him every name in the book; how exactly is this going to proceed, and how much cooperation can be expected from a party that has already questioned (if not rejected) the integrity and the independence of the inquisitor?

There is no doubt that the Syrian regime has good reason to feel paranoid about the case being a political one. As far as Washington and its allies are concerned, it's a matter of when – and not if – some proof of Syria's guilt will be found, which explains US Ambassador John Bolton's announcement that "it's time for confessions." Even in the absence of confessions or of actual proof, it is unlikely that the US will be held back by this minor detail. After the infamous evidence presented by Colin Powell to the Security Council less than 3 years ago, it seems that the burden of proof is not one that concerns the US. Moreover, this time, America has more willing partners.

Public opinion matters, however, and the efforts to demonize the Syrian regime (often helped by the regime itself) are reaching a climax. There has been a gradual and rapid change in the media's tone, with most reports taking Syria's guilt in a number of issues as a given, with little analysis to counter it. With Iraq, the build-up to action took 12 years, and there remained a significant amount of people who weren't convinced that Saddam could deploy his WMDs in 45 minutes. In Syria's case, it is much easier to convince people that every possible mishap in Lebanon is Syria's fault (especially since it's often been the case). With Syria, the metamorphosis will be much quicker – even though the subsequent action will be different from that taken in Iraq.

The Bush administration has been more than eager to find the excuse that would allow it to put Syria in a corner and rain demands upon it, knowing Syria cannot possibly acquiesce to all; conveniently, much can be blamed on Syria. This is assuming that Bush's itch for regime change has been calmed for the moment and that he will take the advice of several allies (foremost of which the Israelis) preferring the status quo with a weakened regime. (It is ironic, really, that the US is punishing Syria - for having tried to impose its choice of leader on another people – by trying to impose its own choice of leader.)

Of course, this is all the more reason the Syrian regime should have known what was coming. But as always, the regime doesn't take initiatives and only reacts (and much too late, to boot) in desperate 11th hour attempts to gather sympathy and support. The letter sent to the members of the UN Security Council yesterday has not been made public, but it is doubtful that a convincing argument will have been made, or that it will make any difference whatsoever at this stage. It is typical of Syrian regime behavior, and maddening that two years on the Security Council did not even serve to improve relations with key countries.

It is very telling that not a single official Arab voice has been heard since the Mehlis report was distributed. Perhaps that is best, for soon after Resolution 1559 was passed, several Arab countries were quick to advise Syria to comply. Of course, 1559 was technically easier for the regime to comply with, as it didn't touch its innermost circles. In fact, it was then easy for the regime to seek sympathy from the Syrian people, turning this into a nationalist issue in the face of increasingly vocal Lebanese opposition; even after Hariri's assassination, the Syrian people seemed to react in unison, feeling insulted and betrayed by the open displays of hostility from Lebanon. At the time, the regime had little to fear from its own people.

But Resolution 1595 is an entirely different matter, and the Syrian people are not as willing to demonstrate total support for the regime. Nobody is fooled by the makeshift demonstrations that took place yesterday in Damascus and Aleppo (as if Syria needed more economic paralysis); as usual, they were mostly composed of students and civil servants who had no choice in the matter. And as usual, it was a completely inappropriate – and completely useless – attempt to demonstrate popular support for the regime. I pass on the slogans repeated ad nauseam, when all pretense that this could have been a heartfelt outcry was dropped. Clearly, the regime has learned nothing, but it should think about the fact that the demonstrators fell far short of the advertised million.

On Sunday, hundreds of lawyers and judges marched to the UN's headquarters in Damascus to decry the report's partiality; again, the regime must have thought this would show the world that even legal professionals were on its side. All of this would have been a lot more meaningful had they all dared – or had they been allowed - to make a similar trek to the Ministry of Interior when Riad Seif, Mamoun Homsi and Aref Dalila were illegally arrested, "tried" and thrown into jail.

Be that as it may, the behavior of Syrian officials and Syrian media in the past few days has been rather indicative of the regime's mood. The press conference organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Saturday illustrates the defensive mode in which the Syrian regime finds itself. Additionally, since Friday, panel after panel of commentators and experts of all sorts have filled Syrian television screens, taking the place of the popular Ramadan series, to discuss the Mehlis report. Famous actors are shown in short interviews, mocking the report and showing no doubt that the US is out to get Syria no matter what it does. Although they've got a point, it is demoralizing to see talented Syrians forced to stoop to that level.

It seems uncharacteristic of Syria to talk openly about such a damning, or at least such an accusatory report; indeed, we are more accustomed to total silence from the Syrian regime. In my opinion, and for the first time in years, this merely shows just how much the regime is worried about the people's reactions, and it shows just how dispensable it fears it has become in their minds.

With the limited internet access in Syria, it is probable that few Syrians have had the chance to read the report and form their own opinions, which is why Syrian media has been having a field day ridiculing the findings and insisting on the political envelope. The Mehlis report couldn't even have been a crime novel, viewers were led to believe, for it fails to make the simplest links and suffers from numerous contradictions. Unfortunately, the sycophants that have filled Syrian airwaves do make a few good points and have occasionally made a reasonable case.

But that would be forgetting that most Syrians do have access to satellite television, and that the story told on other channels differs slightly. While Syrian commentators mentioned the suspect existence of more than one copy of the official report, they didn't volunteer the significance of the differences in the various versions, and kept mum about the names. By now, most Syrians will know who they are and how Detlev Mehlis's penultimate draft presents them, and they have understood the potential impact of their potential guilt.

The matter of Farouk Shara's alleged misleading statement takes the challenge a step further; not only does the Mehlis report potentially implicate the Syrian president's closest people, but it also pretends to send a message regarding the government (and not just the regime), and regarding Syria's general foreign policy in specific: the message, clearly, is that head hunting is now on at the Foreign Ministry - by whom remains to be seen - but contenders for the positions of Minister and Assistant Minister should apply, because this is one of the easier concessions the regime can make. This change should have been made ages ago, under no duress.

[Interestingly, Ghazi Kanan's name does not figure amongst those suspects, and this puts his death into a new perspective. Few tears were shed over his death; in fact, many people wondered whether more officials would become "suicidal," trying to redraw the map of internal Syrian politics and speculating on the coming changes. Kanan's sudden demise probably elicited quite a few sighs of relief from a number of Lebanese, who can only be hopeful that his in-depth knowledge about their dodgy backgrounds will have gone to the grave.]

It is likely that these names were "leaked" to signal to the Syrian regime the extent to which the UN (or the US really) is willing to go. This current report has synergy: its impact is greater than the sum of its parts. Taken apart, it holds little water legally. Taken as a whole, it is an ultimatum.

Come December 15, when the extension to the inquiry will end, the position of these figures will have depended on the cooperation Syria would have extended, and the promises it would have made. The Syrian regime should think very carefully about dismissing the current report's deficiencies as an indication of its own invulnerability. On the contrary, the weak report proves that the stakes are higher and the confrontation inevitable.

Technically, the present report's weaknesses should allow the Syrians to prove their innocence by cooperating fully. In a just court, if Syrian officials are truly innocent, they will have nothing to fear. If some should be found guilty, they must be handed to the court that will try the accused (as Bashar Assad's comment on CNN implied, and although it remains to be determined whether the eventual court will truly be just). The final report is not expected to be weaker than the present one; moreover, few people really believe that guilt or innocence is a real factor anymore.

This leaves the Syrian people – about whom nobody seems to care – in the most unenviable position of feeling forced to support a regime that does not deserve to be supported (not that they're necessarily united in opinion). While the regime wouldn't mind promising America the moon (having already supported in numerous fields, starting with intelligence and ending with torture), it has not demonstrated an ounce of goodwill towards its own people, in spite of their patience. It still tramples on civil liberties, it refuses to free the multitude of prisoners of conscience, it has failed even in its vague promises of economic reform, and it continues to openly abuse its position of power to rake in every possible financial benefit the country has to offer. Rather than delivering some breathing space to its people, rather than trying to make a deal with the only people that matter long term, rather than responding positively to the united opposition's Damascus Declaration, the regime has continued to favor the Mafiosi approach. It is only interested in its own survival, its untold riches and its abusive powers.

The Syrian people feel let down, but they expect – and want - nothing from the powers that claim they're spreading democracy in the region; at the time of the Damascus winter, not a peep had been heard from them, because they preferred to support a regime on which they thought they could count to push their interests.

So why would Syrians now defend this regime? Because American pressure and the fears of a scenario à la Iraq are even worse. In fact, the Bush administration's idiotic approach and the UN's poor case for the moment have only convinced Syrians that the issue is much larger, and have scared them into preferring the devil they know. If you forgive the old pun, in fact, they are afraid that the US plans to throw out the baby with the Baath water.

The threat of looming sanctions only reinforces the despair of the Syrian people, who fear the possibility of cooperation (or the lack thereof) from a regime that only thinks of itself, and of its own endurance. The threat of sanctions also confirms America's complete disregard for the population, and its obsession with getting what it wants at any cost.

Detlev Mehlis's performance today at the Security Council will serve to both qualify and quantify the nature of the warnings to be made to Syria, and it will also define the parameters by which the Syrian regime must abide. Frankly, it doesn't matter anymore whether the Syrian regime eliminated Hariri: the world will be made to believe that it did, and it will support a suitable punishment. In fact, whether or not Syria killed Hariri (and Hariri's assassination was not the biggest crime of all), it will be paying for other misdemeanours (somewhat like Al Capone who was eventually cornered on tax evasion charges). Washington may turn Hariri's assassination for Syria what WMDs became for Iraq.

Syria has mostly itself to blame for much of this predicament. Now, it has absolutely no choice but to cooperate on Mehlis's terms, regardless of the demands: the regime is not in a position to argue over details and time is not on its side. It's therefore is rather futile to speak of "Syrian sovereignty" with regards to the interviews of senior figures of the regime outside of Syria. But the regime should think carefully about how many concessions it can make on other fronts in order to save the skin of a couple of figures: even a deal will be more of a diktat now that all roads seem blocked. The leak of a deal offer nearly two weeks ago, in retrospect, was another opportunity for the US to define the expectations, but not the compensation – which is getting more and more limited. Cooperation, at this late stage, is not only the sole option, but an unprofitable one at that; it will not have the lucrative elements of the Libya deal.

Deal or regime shake (if not change)? What if suspect Syrian officials are handed over, will the US have gotten what it wants? I strongly doubt it.

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For many Palestinians, Yitzhak Rabin is not remembered as a man of peace, but as the breaker of children's bones, amongst other equally correct terms. (Syrians, of course, also remember the "Rabin deposit," withdrawn soon after it had been "conceded.") As Israel prepares to commemorate the ten-year anniversary of his assassination next month (including giving a Jordanian child named Yitzhak Rabin – go figure – temporary resident status), Gideon Levy asks in Haaretz if Israelis haven't exaggerated his legacy, and, asks, above all: Was Rabin in real life indeed similar to the mythological figure that has been constructed around his memory? I quote from Levy's article at length for the benefit of readers in some Arab countries who are denied access to Israeli sites (following a rationale which I have yet to understand).

"It is not by chance that Israel loves so much to commemorate Rabin. For Israel, the living Rabin embodied the best of its secret longings. He was the man who proved that you could have your cake and eat it too - waging war and making peace; issuing commands to break the bones of Palestinians and sitting with them at the negotiating table; building settlements and condemning the settlers in scathing terms; signing an accord with the Palestine Liberation Organization and refraining from evacuating even a single settlement; deliberating with Yasser Arafat and expressing physical repugnance for him; ready to travel to Gush Etzion with a visa but not doing a thing to advance this issue; shocked by the massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein and afraid to evacuate the Hebron settlers.

Perhaps truly on that night, when he refrained from evacuating the Hebron settlers, an important characteristic of his was expressed, a characteristic that is not mentioned when speaking about "Rabin's legacy" (a vague term than no one knows how to define): On that night, Rabin was revealed to be a cowardly statesman. If he had evacuated the Hebron settlers then, when an excellent opportunity for doing this arose, he would have prevented the development of the monster that grew in the city and has already succeeded in driving tens of thousands of terrified residents from their homes."

Levy partly puts the blame for the failure of Oslo on Rabin's lack of courage, as he did not dare to put the evacuation of settlements on the agenda: "Even if the Palestinians themselves, for some unclear reason, were wary of being too adamant in demanding the evacuation of settlements, a statesman like Rabin could have been expected to recognize the Israeli interest in such a move. He should have initiated an evacuation in order to strengthen the agreement."

While acknowledging Rabin's courage in recognizing the PLO, Levy blames him for having wasted so many years, and for not having prevented the bloodshed of the first intifada, recalling that "the first intifada did break out, and the violent and brutal way then defense minister Yitzhak Rabin dealt with it cannot be erased from his "legacy" or the way his portrait is depicted. It is impossible to just remember the statesman who signed a peace treaty with King Hussein, an agreement that did not demand a price from Israel and only provided captivating photo opportunities with a king who had European manners and great personal charm."

Rabin did want peace, writes Levy, but "like most Israelis, did not agree to pay the price." He concludes that pupils in Israel should be told "the full truth about the prime minister who became beloved and revered after his death: He was assassinated on the "altar of peace," but what he did for peace was too little and too late."

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This is the only conclusion with which The Economist could come up this week, as many wait breathlessly for the Mehlis report to emerge on October 25 (assuming there are no surprises or delays). Indeed, after months of speculation, every possible alternative has probably already been debated by most concerned papers and parties, and today The Economist summarizes the plot so far, coming up with three scenarios.

The first (the "dance of the seven veils" scenario) entails the regime reaching a deal with the US, sacrificing a few figureheads while complying fully with American demands and "grudgingly relinquishing positions long declared sacrosanct." In addition to controls on the Iraqi border and restraining Palestinian groups, Hezbollah would be the next "offering" (although I think it may eventually go the whole nine yards, with concessions on the Golan Heights and a peace treaty with Israel). This is the scenario that works best for the regime, according to The Economist (and the one I feel has the most chances of happening - à la Lockerbie - should Syria be declared guilty).

The second (the "cornered cat" scenario) sees the regime lashing out at its tormentors, leading potentially to its demise. The Economist ventures that "It is hard to tell whether various Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which was persecuted by Assad senior, are growing in strength. Some close watchers think its potential exaggerated; others reckon it more likely that military types may already be gaining ground inside Syria's institutions and may make a lunge for power."

The third (the "cornered scorpion" scenario) is the one which The Economist believes is the most plausible, whereby a regime surrounded by fire stings itself, falling to an internal coup (not by the military, as in the cornered cat scenario, but by the innermost family and in-law circles). But the possibility of a military coup (as in the cornered cat scenario) is again suggested by the magazine here, specifically by "young Sunni officers," if Assad's closest advisers are to be sacked following a Mehlis indictment.

Notwithstanding incredibly detailed "reports" about all sorts of events from Al Seyassah, we're still none the wiser. But all this waiting and speculation is not satisfying enough for Max Boot, from the Council on Foreign Relations, who worries about Syria's influence on Iraq (and about Pakistan's influence on Afghanistan, even though he is of the opinion that "the U.S. is making considerable progress" in both countries). While Boot wishes the US would cut Musharraf's "allowance" (to fight Islamists and bring back democracy), he wonders why the Bush administration hasn't attacked Syria yet and recommends, amongst others, bombing strikes and commando raids.

Boot is clearly quite fed up with diplomacy (if that's what we can really call what the Bush administration does in general), and wants actions, not words: "How has Syria been held accountable? Has Damascus been bombed? Have U.S. and Iraqi troops crossed the border to destroy terrorist safe houses?" Boot's great frustration only aggravates at the thought of America's toothless economic sanctions on Syria. Worried about US credibility, he concludes: "Either Bush needs to order some of those steps, or he and his aides need to stop threatening Assad in public."

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I thought I'd heard it all, but was astonished to read in Joshua Landis' latest comments an implication that I support an abrupt removal of the regime (and an American-backed removal to boot)! Being an outspoken opponent of the invasion and occupation of Iraq, I wouldn't wish that on anyone, let alone on my own country. Josh's claim that I follow a "faith-based scenario" (or any other scenario, for that matter) that entails a trust of America is therefore very rich. It is possible, believe it or not, to criticize the regime and demand "reform" while opposing US policy; in fact, most civil society activists do just that, and do not fall into one extreme or the other, as Josh has done.

My critique of Josh's article was just that: a brief comment on its preposterous suggestions, the most outrageous one being that "Washington must back greater restrictions and pressure on the Sunni majority." It didn't occur to me that such shameful recommendations needed to be dignified with alternatives, in an age when we are supposed to be fighting tyranny! With his appeal for more oppression, Josh really has no leg to stand on: his "defense" is indefensible. I wonder how many Syrians, regardless of their religious denomination (I myself am not obsessed with sectarian classification) would approve of his proposal. I would add that it would have been equally outrageous to propose more restrictions and pressure on a minority.

Josh's account of my "ethnic wounded pride" actually amused me; I had always been under the impression that being Syrian was a matter of nationality, rather than ethnicity, but I digress. It wasn't a pride wounded, but an intellect affronted by the ludicrous claim that "because there is an authoritarian culture extending into the deepest corners of Syrian life," enemies of the regime want it to stay. I still fail to see the relation between the two, let alone the evidence of authoritarianism being an intrinsic component of "Syrian ethnicity." The "proofs" Josh takes from Syria's current educational system, known to all Syrians, only serve to illustrate the tremendous damage done by 42 years of a Baathist regime – which Josh would like to preserve by all means, preferably with the help of Washington.

Of course, I have never implied (anywhere) that civil strife is impossible in Syria, although Iraq's example would have hopefully dampened many fighting spirits. However, I will continue to dispute allegations that it is the only possible, or the most likely, outcome of sudden change, and that it would necessarily result in Islamist rule - both being options constantly touted by advocates of the status quo. In fact, Josh conveniently quotes Yassin Haj Saleh (for whom I have nothing but respect) as he lays the primary responsibility for any accrued mistrust between different religious or ethnic groups on the regime.

In any case, I'm glad Josh found the time to read the "anodyne blah blah" which I "would have you all consume" (and which he claims is what really "stands in the way of real progress and the development of democratic institutions"); unfortunately, after a long day, I myself didn't have time to read all of his. I had to scan over his long defense, stopping where I saw my name and chose the points which seemed to merit a response. At least he eventually got the spelling of my name right. (Chatham House, by the way, is still the Royal Institute of International Affairs.)

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Meet Fulla, the very popular (and apparently physically quite Barbiesque) doll manufactured in Syria and sold in the Middle East. She wears a black abaya or a white head scarf and long coat, but has "fashionable dresses" under it all.


Jeroen Kramer/Getty Images, for The New York Times

The tone of the article surprised me a bit when the writer implies that an advertisement is cautioning little girls to cover up Fulla: "When you take Fulla out of the house, don't forget her new spring abaya!" admonishes one commercial introducing a new line of doll clothes. Isn't the word "admonish" a bit loaded? And how else could you sell the "new spring abaya," come to think of it?

Mattel apparently markets a group of collectors' dolls that includes a doll called Leila, designed to represent a Muslim slave girl in an Ottoman court! Very topical indeed.

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That's the Security Council table, where Israel now wants a rotating seat. Seriously.

Yes, there have been countries with a rather torrid background taking their seat at the Security Council. Yes, there have been countries with appalling records of human rights. With two big bullies having controlled it until the end of the Cold War, and with one remaining super-bully (with its sidekick) now making sure it bows their way (and if it doesn’t they still wage war anyway), the Security Council has never been the haven of diplomacy and law enforcement it was supposed to be.

But surely, a country seeking a seat on the Security Council must at the very least have complied with the resolutions passed against it by that same Security Council (in spite of all the vetoes thrown in its favor by the US), never mind all the others resolutions passed by the General Assembly?

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There are obviously some (Syrians included) who can't help feeling a bit of Schadenfreude at Assad's eleventh hour retreat from New York. At the same time, many Syrians feel insulted that their country's president should be practically the only one missing from the UN summit, where numerous leaders (including liars, thugs, thieves and murderers – and not necessarily from "rogue" states) congregated. Why should Syria be the only country amongst 190 not to address the delegates? Regardless of what rather agitated commentators are saying, Syria has national interests and legitimate concerns, like every other state; it has diplomatic and economic ties with most countries of the world, and it is an intrinsic part of the problems - and of the solution - in the Middle East, no matter who's the head of state.

It has gotten tiring to read "reports" stemming from nothing more than wild imagination and wishful thinking. (Al Seyassah may be entertaining for some, but only in small doses for me.) It was hard to ignore the glee dripping from some commentators, whose venom often blinded them from making a distinction between the regime and the people, and – just as importantly – the regime and the state as they debated the Syrian predicament.

So few really know what is going on, and I'm sure we all wish we had a hidden camera in Monte Rosa this week, where Detlev Mehlis is interviewing a number of Syrian officials; those who are privy to American or French plans, or to the findings Mehlis has already made in his investigation on Hariri's assassination, will not know what is transcending within the innermost circles of the Syrian regime. Likewise, those slightly more familiar with what (surely now?) has become a panic in Damascus will not know just how far the US and France (and consequently the EU and the UN) are willing to go, or how much dirt they've dished out.

Summarizing the mixture of feelings of many Syrians from various backgrounds, denominations or political persuasions would probably give us the following paradox: they are equally worried about two alternatives – both of which still seem equally plausible – namely, that the regime will fall suddenly, and that the regime will not fall. I still don't think that the former could happen as rapidly as has been hinted, if only because the US itself doesn’t seem to know how to proceed in the region (neocon agendas and international legality issues notwithstanding), perhaps fearing the "fundamentalist takeover" or the "civil strife" theories (regardless of how distant a possibility). A fleeting penchant for a Rifaat Assad comeback or for the Washington-based Syrian "opposition" (both equally ridiculous) is are options which have no legs to stand on. In spite of the rumors, the US and France may decide that Bashar, and most of what comes with him, is an inescapable part of the solution. Of course, none of these possibilities take into account the wishes of the Syrian people – whatever these may be.

If the final Mehlis report (whose potential impact the Syrian regime had ignored until now to its own peril) directly accuses high figures of the regime, Bashar Assad will have two choices: surrender the accused (to whom remains to be established, given the doubts expressed by various international officials about the capacity of current Lebanese courts to carry out a proper trial, and given the Syrian regime's obvious reluctance to bow to authorities over which it used to rule), or resist. The former may result in an initial sigh of relief in Syria, even if it won't all end there. The latter would be an open invitation for actions against Syria, à la Libya, or, even worse, à la Iraq – basically, the "or else" scenario: drastic sanctions, possible strikes, and certain suffocation of the Syrian people – then again, those might happen anyway on other "grounds."

If the final Mehlis report does not accuse the highest figures of the regime, it could be because Assad has managed to clinch a deal with the US and France, sacrificing a token figure or two (Rustom Ghazaleh being an obvious first candidate, and perhaps his predecessor as well – anyone not related, that is). The primary elements of such a deal seem clear: on both the Lebanese and the Iraqi files, the Syrian regime will pledge to desist from any malevolent designs and will extend every possible help, even sealing the borders with Iraq (as if Iraq could be pacified by this). So far so good; most Syrians would want peace and cooperation on theses frontiers anyway, and wish the regime hadn't put them and itself in this position in the first place.

But I would be surprised if such a deal, should that be the chosen alternative, would stop there; France and the US didn't come this far to achieve only this, and there is a lot more to milk from the Mehlis report, the sword of Damocles over Assad. Imagining that UNSC Resolution 1595 is purely about a criminal case would be terribly naïve; if there was ever a politicized case, this one is it.

Enter the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Palestinian question, and of course the Golan Heights (now that Alexandretta is already spoken for). How far will the US push? How far will the Syrian regime bend? How much of either will the people be able or willing to swallow? It's of course very trendy to trash "Arabism" or "pan-Arabism" (not to be confused with today's Baathism) and to pretend nobody cares about silly things like territory, unity or the Palestinian issue; trendy perhaps, but rather nonsensical on a popular level. There are still millions of Palestinian refugees in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan (not to mention in Palestine) and there are still millions of people who don't think it's OK to accept diktats on certain issues while others are openly rebuffed.

And, just as importantly, enter (or rather exit) the issue of "reform" – a word which has become so generic and self-serving that it can now be used to describe Saudi municipal or Egyptian presidential elections, and decrees legalizing currency exchange in Syria (as was announced yesterday). How much, or how little reform will now be "encouraged" in Syria? When MPs, intellectuals and civil society activists were being "tried" unjustly and thrown into jail, not a peep was heard from the powers who claim they're out to spread democracy in the region – and we've all seen what a fine job they've done in Iraq (in fact, don't call us, we'll call you). I still have fresh memories of the international community's silence when the Damascus Spring was unceremoniously brought to an end, as the US was too busy sending its victims to be tortured in Syria, amongst others, and studying the gift basket of information on "extremists" (read regime opponents). The pliability of the regime is only required for American needs - not Syrian ones.

I don’t know how much more pressure Syrians can take, and what their alternatives are; a Jasmine Revolution sounds great, but I hope it flourishes from Syrian courtyards and gardens, with its namesake's identical intoxicating purity. Hope springs eternal? Perhaps. The internal intelligence networks are slightly too stifling for spontaneous demonstrations, and with most Syrians opposed to orchestrations with foreign "inspiration," who is the director/producer who will recreate the scenes from Martyrs' Square and recast them in Omayad Square?

No answers, just speculation. That said, however, there still is a possibility that in spite of the overwhelming evidence of Syrian domination over Lebanon, there is no clear proof of direct culpability of the regime's higher echelons in Hariri's assassination. Not likely, but possible. Beirut is not Berlin, but Mehlis has been wrong about Syria before; vielleicht ist alles noch nicht klar, Herr Kommissar.

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There's lots to say about Syria, Iraq, and the region, but I keep running into American pieces today. The poet Sharon Olds has declined to attend the National Book Festival in Washington, which, coincidentally or not, takes place September 24, the day of an antiwar mobilization in the capital. She follows Jules Feiffer who boycotted a White House breakfast in protest against the Iraq war. (How I wish Arab intellectuals, writers and artists would dare write such open letters to their leaders in protest about numerous issues; I don't blame them for not trying though, because unlike in Western democracies, they might face jail or torture for such statements.) The Nation, which is encouraging others to follow their example, published Olds' letter to Laura Bush, the host of a special event at the White House. Olds explains why she considered accepting her invitation:

"I thought that I could try to find a way, even as your guest, with respect, to speak about my deep feeling that we should not have invaded Iraq, and to declare my belief that the wish to invade another culture and another country--with the resultant loss of life and limb for our brave soldiers, and for the noncombatants in their home terrain--did not come out of our democracy but was instead a decision made "at the top" and forced on the people by distorted language, and by untruths. I hoped to express the fear that we have begun to live in the shadows of tyranny and religious chauvinism--the opposites of the liberty, tolerance and diversity our nation aspires to.

I tried to see my way clear to attend the festival in order to bear witness--as an American who loves her country and its principles and its writing--against this undeclared and devastating war."

She concludes:

"But I could not face the idea of breaking bread with you. I knew that if I sat down to eat with you, it would feel to me as if I were condoning what I see to be the wild, highhanded actions of the Bush Administration.

What kept coming to the fore of my mind was that I would be taking food from the hand of the First Lady who represents the Administration that unleashed this war and that wills its continuation, even to the extent of permitting "extraordinary rendition": flying people to other countries where they will be tortured for us.

So many Americans who had felt pride in our country now feel anguish and shame, for the current regime of blood, wounds and fire. I thought of the clean linens at your table, the shining knives and the flames of the candles, and I could not stomach it."

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This is how one writer from Kansas imagined Bush would really speak if he had no choice but to say the truth (like in the Jim Carrey movie). I include a few extracts here from the full piece by Jason Miller, as he concentrates on the aftermath of Katrina. It's satire of course, but much more sad than funny.

"I am still an obscenely wealthy and powerful autocratic leader of a nation of sheeple who falsely believe they are free. While I am surrounded by misery and suffering, I make this presentation of shameless propaganda from a comfortable, beautiful stage set while surrounded by an entourage of thugs who assure my safety."

"As the victims search for loved ones and grieve for the dead, America’s attention is diverted from my nomination of a Supreme Court Justice who will strengthen the tyranny I have created, Karl Rove’s criminal behavior, and my administration’s numerous war crimes related to Iraq. The lies and exaggerations of my media lap-dogs have persuaded many Americans that blacks are undisciplined animals who live off of government hand-outs, feeding my agenda to end social welfare programs and perpetuating the lucrative prison-industrial complex. With their persistent cries for civil rights, blacks have been a thorn in the side of the American aristocracy long enough."

"While I realize that Americans expect a more effective response from the federal government when a disaster of this magnitude happens, they need to realize that under my New American Century, domestic programs like FEMA have been rendered impotent. The military is the essence of our government. The US military budget, including money for its ancillary departments, is over $600 billion per year. This siphons money away from domestic, humanitarian programs like emergency response, education, and health care. But the good news is that the rich who have high stakes in entities like the Carlyle Group get richer as a result. Besides, my delayed and feeble response in New Orleans enabled the Gulf Region to rid itself of many of its criminal, useless inhabitants."

"Congress is preparing an investigation of the situation in New Orleans. However, the results will be similar to the probes into 9/11 and Abu Gharib. My administration will see to it that no evidence of our culpability comes to light, and if perpetrators are punished, they will be lower echelon scapegoats."

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Rime Allaf